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Abstract
We introduce a new protocol for secure two-party computation of linear
functions in the semi-honest model, based on coding techniques. We first
establish a parallel between the second version of the wire-tap channel
model and secure two-party computation. This leads us to our protocol,
that combines linear coset coding and oblivious transfer techniques. Our
construction requires the use of binary intersecting codes or q-ary minimal
codes, which are also studied in this paper.
1 Introduction
Secure Multi-party Computation has been introduced in the late eighties by
Yao [Yao86] and has been subject to a lot of studies to demonstrate its feasibility
and completeness in several adversarial settings. Recently, a lot of work has been
done to make these techniques practical. We refer the reader to [Gol04,HL10,
CDN12] for overviews on the state of the art in Secure Multi-Party Computation.
We here focus on the two-party setting. In this setting, two parties P1 and P2,
holding respective inputs X and Y , wish to securely compute a function f on
their inputs. At the end of the protocol, one party (or both) learns f(X,Y ),
but gains no more information about the other party’s input than what can
be deduced from this output. The seminal example given by [Yao86] is the
millionaire’s problem: two millionaires wish to know which one of them is the
richer, without revealing their respective wealths. We here focus on the semi-
honest adversarial model, where both parties are supposed to follow the protocol
but where they try to infer more information than they should from all data
exchanges. Yao [Yao86] gives a construction fulfilling these requirements [LP09],
applicable to any function expressed as binary circuit. This technique is based
on garbled circuits and oblivious transfer.
Oblivious transfer, originally introduced by Rabin [Rab81] in a slightly dif-
ferent version, enables one receiver R to get one out of N secrets X1, . . . , XN
held by a sender S. The receiver chooses an index c ∈ {1, . . . , N}, gets Xc and
learns nothing about the Xj ’s, for j 6= c. Symmetrically, the sender S learns
nothing about c. This thus also known as Symmetric Private Information Re-
trieval (SPIR). Many protocols and implementations exist for oblivious transfer,
some pointers can be found in [Lip].
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The Wire-Tap Channel model has been introduced by Wyner [Wyn75] and
later extended by Ozarow and Wyner [OW84] to a second version considering an
erasure channel for the eavesdropper. We here consider the Wire-Tap Channel
II (WTC2) [OW84] to establish a parallel with Secure Two-Party Computation.
The model for WTC2 is described in Figure 1. Alice sends an encoded message
to Bob. Eve is allowed to access a bounded number of coordinates of the code-
word, and she moreover controls the erasure positions. In the original model,
Eve is not supposed to learn any information about the original message, even
knowing the coding and decoding algorithms. Later [Wei91,CLZ94], the infor-
mation gained by Eve if she learns more than the original bound was studied. In
particular, using coset coding techniques, there exists a sequence (di) of bounds
such that Alice gains less than i information bits about the original message if
she has access to less than di coordinates of the message.
Alice Enc
erasures
Bob
Eve
m c
chosen bits of c
Figure 1: The Wire-Tap Channel II
This is where we establish the parallel with Secure Two-Party Computation.
We see the two parties performing the secure computation as Alice and Eve in
the WTC2 model. The message that is encoded by Alice would be the input
X of Alice. We want the bits of information that Eve gets about X to be the
actual bits of f(X,Y ). We will explain in this paper how to do this using linear
coset coding techniques and some classes of linear functions. The last thing we
need to achieve the parallel is a modeling of the erasure channel. This will be
done using oblivious transfers. We illustrate this parallel in Figure 2.
P1 Enc
oblivious transfers P2
X
c
chosen bits of c
Figure 2: From WTC2 to Secure Two-Party Computation
In Section 2, we recall some results about Wire-Tap Channel II and linear
coset coding. We infer a protocol for secure two-party computation in Sec-
tion 3. This raises the problem of finding minimal linear codes, that we study
in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2
2 Wire-Tap Channel II and Linear Coset Cod-
ing
In the following, a [n, k, d] linear code denotes a subspace of dimension k of Fnq
with minimal Hamming distance d, where q = pk, for p prime and k ∈ N. We
denote by C⊥ the dual code of C. The support of c ∈ C is supp(c) = {i ∈
{1, . . . , n}|ci 6= 0}. We might use bit, by abuse of language, even if q 6= 2, to
denote a coordinate of a message or of a codeword.
2.1 Linear Coset Coding
Coset coding is a random encoding used for both models of Wire-Tap Chan-
nel [Wyn75,OW84]. This type of encoding uses a [n, k, d] linear code C with
a parity-check matrix H . Let r = n − k. To encode a message m ∈ Frq, one
randomly chooses an element among all x ∈ Fnq such that m = H
tx. To decode
a codeword x, one just applies the parity-check matrix H and obtains the syn-
drome of x for the code C, which is the message m. This procedure is summed
up in Figure 3.
Given: C a [n, n− r, d] linear code with a r × n parity-check matrix H
Encode: m ∈ Fr2 7→R x ∈ F
n
2 s.t. H
tx = m
Decode: x ∈ Fn2 7→ m = H
tx
Figure 3: Linear Coset-coding
2.2 The Wire-Tap Channel I
The Wire-Tap Channel was introduced by Wyner [Wyn75]. In this model, a
sender Alice sends messages over a potentially noisy channel to a receiver Bob.
An adversary Eve listens to an auxiliary channel, the Wire-Tap channel, which
is a noisier version of the main channel. It was shown that, with an appropriate
coding scheme, the secret message can be conveyed in such a way that Bob
has complete knowledge of the secret and Eve does not learn anything. In the
special case where the main channel is noiseless, the secrecy capacity can be
achieved through a linear coset coding scheme.
2.3 The Wire-Tap Channel II
Ten years later, Ozarow and Wyner introduced a second version of the WT
Channel [OW84]. In this model, both main and Wire-Tap channels are noiseless.
This time, the disadvantage for Eve is that she can only see messages with
erasures: she has only access to a limited number of bits per codeword. She is
however allowed to choose which bits she can learn. We summarize the Wire-
Tap Chanel II in Figure 1.
The encoding used in this model is again a coset coding based on a linear
code C, as in the Wire Tap Channel I with a noiseless main channel. Let d⊥
denote the minimal distance of the dual C⊥ of C. One can prove (see [Wei91]
for instance) that, if Eve can access less than d⊥ bits of a codeword, then she
gains no information at all on the associated message.
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2.4 Generalized Hamming Distances
Generalized Hamming distances (or generalized Hamming weights) have first
been considered by Wei [Wei91]. The ith generalized Hamming distance, de-
noted by di(C) or di is the minimum size of the union of the supports of i
linearly independent codewords in C. We have 1 ≤ d = d1 ≤ . . . ≤ dk ≤ n.
Using generalized Hamming distances, we get a more precise evaluation of
the information gained by Eve in the WTC2, depending on the linear code used
for coset coding. For i = 1, . . . , r, let d⊥i denote the i
th generalized Hamming
distance of C⊥, the dual code of C. We have the following result [Wei91]:
Theorem 1 (WTC2 and Generalized Hamming Distances). If Eve gets less
than d⊥i bits of the codeword c, she gains at most i − 1 information bits about
the original message m.
3 Our Protocol for Secure Two-Party Compu-
tation
3.1 The Setting
We describe our setting in Figure 4. Notice that we can also give the result
to P1: since we work in the semi-honest model, where both parties follow the
protocol, we can let P2 send f(X,Y ) to P1, once he has computed it.
Inputs:
• Party P1 inputs X ∈ Frq
• Party P2 inputs Y ∈ S
• Both parties know a description of f : Frq × S → Fq
Outputs:
• P1 learns nothing about Y
• P2 obtains f(X,Y ) but learns nothing more about X than what can
be inferred from f(X,Y ).
Figure 4: Our Secure Two-Party Computation Setting
We consider the secure evaluation of functions of the form
f : Frq × S → Fq
(X,Y ) 7→ f(X,Y ) =
r∑
i=1
fi(Y ) · xi
where S is a given set, and fi : S → Fq, for i = 1, . . . , r. This class covers all
linear functions of X and Y with range Fq (i. e. giving one ”bit of information”
about X to P2).
For instance, if Y ∈ Frq and fi(Y ) = yi, f is the scalar product over F
r
q.
Squared euclidean distance can also be computed this way. P1 also inputs
xr+1 =
r∑
i=1
x2i and fi(Y ) = −2yi, for i = 1, . . . , r, fr+1(Y ) = 1. Thus , P2
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obtains
r∑
i=1
x2i−2xiyi, which is equivalent (for P2) to the knowledge of d(X,Y ) =
r∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2: it gives no additional information.
If q = p > log(r) and inputs are binary vectors seen in Fq, it is also possible
to compute Hamming distance (take fi(Y ) = 1− 2yi).
Securely computing these functions has applications in the signal processing
and cryptographic domains, especially for privacy-preserving biometric recogni-
tion [SSW09,BCP13].
3.2 From theWire-Tap Channel to Secure Two-Party Com-
putation
As discussed in the introduction and illustrated in Figure 2, we transpose the
WTC2 model to the Secure Two-party Computation setting, by assigning the
role of Alice to P1, the role of Eve to P2 and modelling the erasure channel
by oblivious transfers. We will use the notation OT nt to denote the t-out-of-n
functionality described in Figure 5. This can be implemented either using t
OT n1 ’s or more specific constructions, see [Lip].
Inputs:
• Sender S inputs n elements X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Fq
• Receiver R inputs t indices i1, . . . , it ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Outputs:
• S learns nothing about i1, . . . , it
• R obtains Xi1 , . . . , Xit but learns nothing about (Xi)i/∈{i1,...,it}
Figure 5: The OT nt Functionality
3.3 Choosing the Code
Let us first see how P2 can choose the coordinates of the codeword that he gets
through oblivious transfer, in order to obtain f(X,Y ). Let us consider the r×n
matrix H that is the parity-check matrix of the code C used for coset coding, or,
equivalently, the generator matrix of its dual code c⊥. We denote by Hi the i
th
row of H . Let Z be an encoding of X , i. e. such that X = HtZ =
∑
Hizi. We
consequently have xi = Hi ·
tZ and f(X,Y ) =
∑
fi(Y ) ·xi =
∑
fi(Y ) ·Hi ·
tZ =
(
∑
fi(Y ) ·Hi) ·tZ.
Thus, P2 only needs the coordinates of Z at the positions where
∑
fi(Y ) ·Hi
is nonzero, i. e. at the positions belonging to the support of V =
∑
fi(Y ) ·Hi.
This will ensure correctness. Let i1, . . . , it = supp(V ).
Now we need to ensure privacy of P1’s data. We assume that P2 only gets
zi1 , . . . , zit . If there exists another vector W ∈ C
⊥, such that V and W are
linearly independent and supp(W ) ⊂ supp(V ), then P1 learns at least another
bit of information (W tZ) about Z. To ensure P1 only learns f(X,Y ), we need
to enforce that V is minimal in C⊥, i. e. that his support does not contain the
support of another linearly independent codeword W ∈ C⊥. Since we wish to
ensure a notion of completeness, i. e. to make our protocol usable with any f
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and Y fitting our setting, we require every codeword of C⊥ to be minimal, i. e.
we require C⊥ to be a minimal linear code (see Section 4).
Now let us fix some V ∈ C⊥, let t = |supp(V )| and let us consider the
linear application φ : C⊥ → Fn−tq ; c 7→ (ci)i/∈supp(V ). Due to the definition of
linearity, only the λV , for λ ∈ Fq have a support included in supp(V ) thus
Kerφ = Fq.V and rank(φ) = dim(C
⊥)− 1 = k− 1. Thus, if we let P2 learn the
t coordinates of Z corresponding to supp(V ), the remaining coordinates lie in a
space of dimension k − 1 and P2 only learns one bit of information about X .
Consequently, using a minimal codeword ensures privacy of P1 against P2.
3.4 Our Protocol
We put together our studies of the last paragraphs and we get the protocol
described in Figure 6. Privacy against P2 is ensured thanks to the remarks of
Section 3.3 and privacy against P1 is ensured by the use of oblivious transfer,
which is the only data exchange from P2 to P1. Correctness is also discussed in
Section 3.3.
Some details still need to be considered. The size t of supp(V ) can reveal
information about Y to P1. Thus, either we need an oblivious transfer protocol
that hides to the sender the number of transferred items, or we require P2 to
perform wmax − t dummy requests, where wmax is the maximal weight of a
codeword of C⊥. Since we work in the semi-honest model, this will not break
the security properties (of course, a malicious (active) adversary would use real
requests instead, but that setting is out of the scope of this paper).
Inputs:
• Party P1 inputs X = (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ Frq
• Party P2 inputs Y
• A [n, r] minimal linear code C with generator r×n matrix H . Let Hi
be the ith row of H .
• A function f such that f(X,Y ) =
r∑
i=1
fi(Y ) · xi, where fi(Y ) ∈ Fq.
Protocol:
• P1 uniformly randomly picks an element Z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Fnq such
that X = HtZ
• P2 computes V =
r∑
i=1
fi(Y ) ·Hi ∈ F
n
q
• Let (i1, . . . , it) = supp(V ), P1 and P2 perform an OT nt on Z and
(i1, . . . , it). P2 gets zi1 , . . . , zit .
• P2 outputs f(X,Y ) = V¯ · Z¯, where V¯ = (vi1 , . . . , vit) and Z¯ =
(zi1 , . . . , zit)
Figure 6: Our Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation
We would like to point out that this protocol might not only have theoretical
interest. For instance, the protocol of [BCP13] uses coding-like techniques and
oblivious transfer only, and is one of the most efficient protocol for securely com-
puting functions such as Hamming distances on binary vectors, outperforming
protocols based on additively homomorphic cryptosystems or on garbled cir-
cuits. In the case of the protocol of this paper, performance will highly rely
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on the rate of the underlying code. As we explain in Section 4, we are lacking
results in the q-ary case.
3.5 Examples
We consider as an illustration the secure evaluation of scalar product over Frq,
i. e. f(X,Y ) =
r∑
i=1
xi · yi. One can deduce how to proceed for any function
encompassed by our protocol, by replacing yi by fi(Y ).
3.5.1 Simplex and Hamming Codes
One can easily be convinced that constant-weight codes are minimal, in the
binary or the q-ary case. Since we use linear codes, constant-weight codes are
simplex codes (or equivalent), duals of Hamming codes [Bon84]. Let q = 2, r =
3, n = 7. The 3× 7 matrix H can for example be written as follows:
H =

0 0 0 1 1 1 10 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1


Let X = (101) and Y = (110). P1 can for instance encode X with Z =
(0000100). Y computes V = H1+H2 = (0111100) and requests, using oblivious
transfers, the bits z2, z3, z4, z5. P2 thus gets Z¯ = (0001). By dot-product with
V¯ , P2 gets the result f(X,Y ) =
∑
xi · yi = 1.
Notice that, since the code is constant-weight, P2 always requests 4 bits, we
thus do not need to hide the number of requested bits. Unfortunately, this nice
property is only enjoyed by simplex codes, that have a very bad rate, n growing
exponentially with r, the rates being even worse in the q-ary case.
3.5.2 A More Efficient Binary Example
In the binary case, we can easily obtain minimal codes with better rates than
simplex codes (see Section 4). For instance, let r = 4, we can have n = 9
(optimal [Slo93]), for instance using
H =


1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1


Using this code, P2 will request either 4 or 6 coordinates of Z, to obtain
f(X,Y ), depending on Y . For instance if Y = (1000) or Y = (0011), P2 will
only request 4 coordinates, but if Y = (0110), P2 will need 6 coordinates.
3.5.3 Comparison to the Yao’s Protocol
Let us consider secure evaluation of scalar product over Fr2 using Yao’s protocol
[Yao86, HL10, Sch12]. The binary circuit contains r AND gates, we do not
count XOR gates (see [Sch12] and references therein for known optimizations
on garbled circuits). Let k be a security parameter (e.g. 80 or 128). Party P1
has to compute r garbled gates (4r hash function evaluations). Party P2 has to
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Protocol OT (computation Add. data Add. compu- Add. compu-
+ data exchanges) exchanges tation (P1) tation (P2)
Yao r ×OT 21 4rk bits 4r hash r hash
(k-bit inputs) function eval. function eval.
Our 1×OT nwmax ∅ Linear Linear
Protocol (1-bit inputs) algebra algebra
Table 1: Comparison with the Yao’s protocol, in the binary case
evaluate r garbled gates gates (r hash function evaluations). They perform k
OT 21 ’s on k-bit inputs (P2’s input wire labels). Furthermore, P1 also needs to
send r k-bit keys (P1’s input wire labels) and r garbled gates (3rk bits).
Now let us consider our protocol using a [n, r] minimal code with maximum
codeword Hamming weight equal to wmax. Our protocol requires linear algebra
operations and a OT nwmax , with 1-bit inputs. For instance, the OT
n
wmax operation
can be realized using wmaxOT
n−wmax+1
1 , still with 1-bit inputs, but there might
be more efficient procedures. Using for instance the construction of [CZ94] to
build minimal binary codes, one can have n ≈ 6.4r, for any r. This comparison
in the binary case is summed up in Table 1.
4 Intersecting Codes and Minimal Codes
In our protocol, we need linear codes where all codewords are minimal. Let
C be a linear code of length n. A codeword c is said to be minimal if ∀c′ ∈
C, (supp(c′) ⊂ supp(c)) =⇒ (c and c′ are linearly dependent). We say that
a linear code C is minimal if every nonzero codeword of C is minimal. This
notion is closely related to the notion of intersecting codes [CL85]. The notions
are identical in the binary case but no more in the q-ary case (a minimal code is
intersecting, but the inverse is not always true). We recall that an intersecting
code C is such that for all nonzero c, c′ ∈ C, supp(c) ∩ supp(c′) 6= ∅.
Interestingly, use of intersecting codes or minimal codewords has been sug-
gested for oblivious transfer [BCS96] and for secret sharing [AB98,DY03,SL12],
which is a tool widely used for Secure Multi-Party Computation [CDN12].
4.1 The binary case
Due to the coincidence with the notion of intersecting codes, binary minimal
codes have received a lot of attention [CL85,Slo93,CZ94,BCS96,EC99]. For in-
stance, [CL85] gives definitions, some generic constructions and non-constructive
bounds on rates; [Slo93] gives explicit constructions for small dimensions and
summarizes bounds on minimal distance; [CZ94] gives an explicit constructive
sequence of intersecting codes with high rate, and so on. We do not here detail
these results. We only sum up what is important for us: there exist explicit
constructions of minimal binary linear codes with good rates. Thus, our proto-
col of Section 3 can be constructed in the binary case using codewords whose
size grows linearly with the size of the inputs
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4.2 The q-ary case
Finding minimal q-ary codes has received little attention [DY03,GLL10, SL12]
in the domain of secret sharing. [SL12] details some properties of minimal linear
codes, in particular some sufficient conditions for a code to be minimal are
given. [DY03, SL12] exhibit constructions of minimal codes using irreducible
cyclic codes, which unfortunately do not achieve good rates. As said before,
simplex codes are minimal, they however suffer from a very bad rate. Indeed, a
simplex code of dimension k has length qk − 1. This gives us an existential and
constructive result about q-ary minimal linear codes, but we still need better
rates.
One can also build a q-ary minimal linear code by expanding the columns of
the generator matrix of a binary intersecting codes and adding every column of
elements in Fq sharing the same support. This however does not lead to good
codes either. For instance, we can expand the 4 × 9 H matrix of Section 3.5.2
to a 4 × (4q + (q − 1)3) matrix, which is slightly better than the simplex code.
For instance, with q = 3, we obtain the following 4× 20 matrix.
H =


1 0 11 0 0 00 11 00 11111111
0 1 12 0 0 00 00 11 11112222
0 0 00 1 0 11 12 00 11221122
0 0 00 0 1 12 00 12 12121212


Interestingly, through other means, Song and Li [SL12] also construct a
[20, 4] ternary minimal code.
We exhibit two bounds on the rates of minimal codes. Unfortunately, these
proofs are not constructive.
Theorem 2 (Maximal Bound). Let C a minimal linear [n, k, d] q-ary code, then
R ≤ logq(2)
Proof. This bound is even true for non-linear minimal codes. Let us consider
the family F of the supports of the vectors of C. Due to the definition of
minimal codes, this is a Sperner family. It is known that |F | ≤
(
n
n/2
)
. Thus,
|C| = qk ≤ 1 + (q − 1)
(
n
n/2
)
then R = k/n ≤ logq(2).
Theorem 3 (Minimal Bound). For any R, 0 ≤ R = k/n ≤ 12 logq(
q2
q2−q+1 ),
there exists an infinite sequence of [n, k] minimal linear codes.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of [CL85] in the binary case. Let us fix n
and k. For a ∈ Fnq , such that |supp(a)| = i, there are q
i− q linearly independent
vectors b such that supp(b) ⊂ supp(a). The pair (a, b) belongs to
[
n− 2
k − 2
]
linear
[n, k] codes, where
[
x
k
]
denotes the q-ary Gaussian binomial coefficient.
There are less than
n∑
i=0
(q− 1)i(qi − q) = (1+ (q− 1)q)n− qn ≤ (q2− q+1)n
such ordered “bad” (a, b) pairs. At least
[
n
k
]
−
[
n− 2
k − 2
]
(q2− q+1)n linear [n, k]
codes thus contain no “bad” pairs, i. e. are minimal. For k/n ≤ 12 logq(
q2
q2−q+1 ),
the quantity is positive.
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Notice that the minimal bound exposed in Theorem 3 meets the 12 log2(
4
3 )
bound in the binary case exhibited in [CL85]. We can however not use the
same techniques as in the binary case (e.g. [CL85, CZ94]) to obtain explicit
constructions with high rates, which remains an open issue.
5 Conclusion
We present a theoretical protocol for performing secure two-party computation
of linear functions based on linear codes and oblivious transfer only, using a
parallel with the Wire-Tap Channel II model. Due to the efficiency of linear
algebra and current constructions of oblivious transfer, this could be a basis for
efficient protocols for secure evaluation of some classes of functions.
Several leads for future research are:
• Constructions of good q-ary minimal linear codes;
• Other encoding techniques than linear coset coding;
• Techniques to encompass secure computation of non-linear functions;
• Techniques to deal with malicious adversaries.
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